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ARGUMENT 
I. Has Mr. Kearl Failed to Cite the Applicable Standard of Review? 
Defendant Okelberry argues, in essence, that Plaintiff Kearl has cited the incorrect 
standard of review for each of its issues and that the appropriate standard is always an 
abuse of discretion. (Appellee's Br. 23.) In order to support this argument, Defendant 
Okelberry confuses the issues that were raised by Plaintiff Keairl. (See Appellee's Br. 1, 
3; cf. Plaintiff Kearl's Br. 6-7,17, 36.) 
The first issue, per Defendant Okelberry, is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by declining to ask Plaintiff Kearl's voir dire questions regarding alcohol use. 
(Appellee's Br. 1,24.) That is an incorrect rehearsal of the issue. The main issue raised 
by Plaintiff Kearl is whether the general voir dire offered by the Trial Court to the venire 
panel was adequate. (Appellant's Br. 17.) Plaintiff Kearl only raises the issue of the 
rejection of specific voir dire questions it sought to ask at trial as that relates to a factor in 
the test espoused by this Court regarding adequacy of voir dire. Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc., 204 P.3d 204,209-210 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (citing Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 
96, 100-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The adequacy of voir dire is Reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Defendant Okelberry also offers an incorrect rehearsal of their Fifth Issue. 
(Appellee's Br. 3-4, 38-40.) The issue is not whether an expert can offer testimony 
which contradicts that of another expert, but raises rather specific issues regarding 
interpretations and rulings under the Utah Rules of Evidence. #irst, whether the Trial 
5 
Court can refuse to allow Plaintiff Kearl to offer evidence that an expert has been hired 
by an insurance company, when that evidence is not produced to show negligence or 
other wrongful actions. See Utah R. Evid. 411. Second, whether a witness can offer 
testimony that is the result of testing a product without sufficient evidence that the 
product was in substantially the same condition, in all relevant aspects, when tested as it 
was at the time of injury. Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 
472, 479 (1st Cir. 1997) (citingKukuruza v. GeneralElec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208,1211-1212 
(1st Cir. 1975)). These are both issues raised as incorrect interpretations and rulings on 
the Rules of Evidence, properly preserved, and are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See State v. Silva, 13 P.3d 604, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Defendant Okelberry admits that Jury Instructions are reviewed for correctness. 
(Appellee's Br. 5.) 
Defendant Okelberry admits that the standard for a judge's failure to recuse, when 
required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, is unclear at the least. (Id.) Plaintiff Kearl 
argues, under the specific circumstances of this case, as they apply directly to the Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct, a higher level scrutiny than a mere abuse of discretion is 
necessary on review. (See infra, discussion, 18-19.) 
Upon further review and consideration of the remaining issues, Plaintiff Kearl 
accepts that under recent cases in the State of Utah exclusion of jurors and sanctions for 
egregious misconduct by counsel are each reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
II. This Court Should Remand for a New Trial Based on the Inadequate Voir 
Dire Offered by the Trial Court. 
6 
I • T^iJ : • -!- • ' • .iistakenlj f argi le s in its statement of facts that "after 
completion of the questionnaire, and appropriate time for counsel to review the 
completed forms, the jury pool 'was brought into the courtroom,.'and the court conducted 
i! own additional ' on iliiini f ounsi 1 v dh (lint iflcr nflnrdrd ail nppoituml y In request 
individual questioning, in chambers, of any prospective juror from whom they wanted 
additional information." Brief of Appellee at 9 This statement has important 
inaccuracies. PdtTitLinl I )kell)i my also .ni'iir, (lull IMiiintill Kcar! In.is not '.llitmn tlul hi 
proposed voir dire questions were not asked. This statement is also incorrect. First, there 
was no "additional, voir dire" before questioning in chambers. The trial record begins 
\ cilioning in chambers. I he jurors came in early ami \\ ere given Ihe questionnaire 
to fill out, and counsel reviewed the answers. After counsel reviewed the answers they 
were allowed to ask, in chambers follow-up questions to answers given on the 
questionnaire. I he trial record begins with counsel and the Court in chambers asking 
information or clarification of responses," Defendant Okelberry 's Facts Relating to 
Juror Misconduct, No.2, 85,2-853. Defendant Okelberry requested the opportunity to ask. 
In ixor Harward foil :: • \ l lp questions 1o his rttiswIT lo qmesfnHI "' hei ,nise Mi I lanvard sinrl 
in his response that he did favor filing of civil law suits as a means of resolving disputes 
"if needed " A transcript of the follow-up questions asked Mr. Harward in chambers is 
pail of llir appeal ivuird ill1 "'MW pp } 4 attached as F^hibil L1 U\ Appellant s Hurl 
Plaintiff Kearl did not ask follow-up questions to Mr. Harward5s answer to question 7 
because Mr. Harward seemed to have no prejudice against law suits and all of his other 
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answers seemed appropriate.1 Plaintiff Kearl did not ask questions about alcohol because 
the Court had already rejected Plaintiff Kearl's request for questions about alcohol. 
The voir dire offered by the Trial Court was inadequate to ferret out specific bias. 
Where voir dire has been inadequate because it does not allow for the discovery of biases 
or prejudices in perspective jurors, this court has remanded for a new trial. See Barrett v. 
Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470,472 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). The adequacy of voir dire is determined by such factors as the 
generalness of the questions asked by the Trial Court, whether the court allowed counsel 
to present its own questions, and if a biased jury was impaneled as the result. Id. This 
Court has determined that adequacy of voir dire is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Doe 
v. Hqfen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990). However, a trial court abuses its discretion and thus commits reversible error 
when, "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
A case on point is the most recently decided Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 204 
P.3d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). In this case petitioner was granted a new trial, and one of 
the several reasons for the ruling turned on the following: Petitioner had requested that a 
set of voir dire questions be asked to the venire panel, which it thought would Ferret out 
jury bias. The trial court, however, rejected these questions, electing instead to ask its 
1
 After all of the follow-up questions to the questionnaire were asked in chambers, the 
Court introduced counsel and the Parties visually to the jury in the courtroom to see if 
that would change any of the jurors answers to question 20 which listed the parties, 
counsel, and witnesses and asked jurors to state if they knew any of them. 
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own broad questions. The questions turned out to be inadequate and a jury tainted by 
bias was empanelled as the result. Id. at 207. 
In fleshing out this issue,, the Court quoted from Barrett v. Peterson that, pointing 
t '' . "explained that the decision about whether such voir dire questions 
should K asKed "requires o balancing of the relative interests of the parties in light of the 
facts and circumstances oi the particular case ' Bee i 4nheustr- ausch. , ;u . . , X 
20(> {citing Barrett K6K P ?r| n( I III) l I i \t\u\' Finm 1 Ih i/v X >4 V - • •: -
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 ( Utah 1992)). The specific issue dealt with in Evans, 
Barrett, and Bee v. Anheuser-Busch was that of "exposure to tort-reform propaganda." 
I 
subconscious bias, and that counsel must be allowed to uncover that bias if an impartial 
jury is to be impaneled. See Id, ("[rjeason suggests that exposure to tort-reform 
propaganda maj loslei a subconscious bias K itliin certain prosj. 
"Accordingly, even when specific examples of tort-reform propaganda are not presented 
to the court, a 'plaintiff has a legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have 
read or v^ara miormation generally on ... tort reform.' " ' ' Bee v Anheuser-Busch, i nc, 204 
The Court continues: 
"In this case, none of the qu i.-.^ od by the trial court even remotely 
addressed whether the prospective jurors had heard or read anything 
relating to tort-reform issues. Nor did the trial court attempt to address in a 
more general fashion the issues of... tort-reform propaganda in its voir dire 
questioning. The court asked only broad questions concerning the 
prospective jurors' self-assessed ability to be fair and impartial As a result 
of this limited line of questioning, appellant was wholly unable to 
determine which, if any, prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform,,. 
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propaganda, much less whether that exposure produced hidden or 
subconscious biases affecting their ability to render a fair and impartial 
verdict. Thus, under Evans, the trial court's line of questioning ignored 
Appellant's need to garner information necessary both to detect actual bias 
and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges." 
Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 204 P.3d at 209 {citing Barrett, 868 P.2d at 100-02) 
(emphasis in original). 
The present case is on point with Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Barrett, and Evans. As 
the Plaintiff in Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, counsel for Mr. Kearl was aware of the possibility 
of unconscious bias against his client, in the instant case stemming from Mr. Kearl's use 
and consumption of alcohol. In order to ferret out this bias, Mr. Kearl sought to submit 
three questions to the venire panel. These questions were proper and they are not in 
dispute. They were: 
63. Do you drink alcohol? Yes No 
64. Does any member of your family drink alcohol? Yes No 
65. Would you have a hard time being impartial toward a party if they 
drink alcohol? Yes No If "yes," please explain... 
(Appellee's Br. 8, quoting R. 566.) Mr. Kearl requested these specific questions in order 
to know how best to use his peremptory challenges. Like the court in Bee v. Anheuser-
Busch, the Trial Court rejected Mr. Kearl's proposed questions and refused to ask any of 
them, instead offering its own general questionnaire.2 For this Court's benefit, a copy of 
2
 As stated in the initial brief, the final pretrial conference where the Court stated what 
voir dire questions it would use was on October 24, 2007, and due to equipment 
malfunction or clerk error the final pretrial conference was not recorded so there is no 
record of the Court's decision regarding voir dire except the minute entry on that date 
which says, "The Court and counsel discuss the questionnaire that will be given to the 
jury." 
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that questionnaire filled out by Juror Gary Harward is attached. {See Prospective Juror 
Questionnaire, attached as Exhibit A hereto.) 
Defendant Okelberry admits that the juror questionnaire used by the Court was 
ambiguous. R. at 949, p. 7-8. The Trial Court also inferred that the questionnaire was 
ineffective when it stated that: 
" if it had come to my attention, along with the attorneys, that a panel 
member, a potential panel juror, had strong feelings and opinions with 
respect to religious beliefs and evidence that would be contrary to that 
potential juror's own attitude and feelings about religious beliefs, we would 
all have excluded him. There was no indication, there was no evidence, 
there was no implication that could be drawn from anything that was 
presented in the written response to questions or the interview with the 
potential juror that would have - that did raise a red flag with respect to the 
religious beliefs or the feelings or attitudes of that particular Juror, Mr. 
Harwood." 
R. at 949, p. 13-14. 
As can be seen, this questionnaire did not allow for questions regarding specific 
instances of juror bias that were likely to come up in trial. Also, as in Bee v. Anheuser-
3
 The questionnaire given by the Court to the jury was not included in the record. This 
was obviously a clerical mistake. Plaintiff Kearl did not realize this mistake was made 
until after he filed his initial brief on appeal. On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff Kearl filed a 
motion to supplement the record to include additional transcripts, supplementation of 
what the Trial Court said at the October 24 final pre-trial hearing since it was not 
recorded, and to include a copy of the voir dire questions actually used by the Trial Court 
since they were mistakenly left out of the record. Defendant Okelberry objected to the 
inclusion of additional transcripts and to supplementation of what the Trial Court said on 
October 24, but did not object to inclusion of the voir dire questions used by the Trial 
Court. This Court denied the motion to supplement the record. Defendant hereby 
requests through a motion filed herewith that the voir dire questions used by the Trial 
Court as represented by the questions filled out by Juror Gary Harward, and attached as 
Exhibit A to this brief, be included in the record on appeal on the grounds that Defendant 
Okelberry did not object to Plaintiff Kearl's motion to include them. Also, Defendant 
Okelberry cannot be prejudiced by inclusion of the questionnaire because he refers to it 
and quotes from it in his Brief of Appellee. Brief of Appellee at 8-9. 
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Busch, Barrett, and Evans, the trial court did not permit counsel to confront the venire 
panel with regards to anything beyond the scope of its prepared questionnaire. It did not 
permit counsel to ask their own questions, but instead constrained all questioning to the 
very narrow focus of its general voir dire. The trial court was unwilling to allow Plaintiff 
Kearl's questions to go forward, and as a result a jury tainted by bias was empanelled. 
Defendant Okelberry has argued that in order for Mr. Kearl to raise questions on 
alcohol use in voir dire, he would have had to provide legal analysis and authority for the 
specific questions and would had to have shown the court exactly how and where such 
issues would arise. (Appellee's Br. 24-25.) But, as we see under Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, 
this is simply not the case. Mr. Kearl is not required to be prescient; rather the issue is 
one of whether the questions are related to a bias which could reasonably arise under the 
specific circumstances of the case. Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 204 P.3d at 209 (citing 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 100-02). For emphasis, we quote again from Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, 
"Accordingly, even when specific examples of tort-reform propaganda are not presented 
to the court, a 'plaintiff has a legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have 
read or heard information generally on ... tort reform." Id. This sentence could just as 
easily read, "Accordingly, even when specific examples of biases against alcohol 
consumption and the reasons therefore are not presented to the court, a plaintiff has a 
legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have such biases." 
Defendant Okelberry also argues that Plaintiff Kearl does not point to how the 
issue of alcohol became a part of the trial. This is probably not necessary since the 
affidavit of the jury foreman, Kay Armstrong, shows that use of alcohol was an issue 
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discussed by the jury and was one issue that prejudiced juror Gary Harward, and 
consequently other members of the jury. Nevertheless, as pointed out in Plaintiff Kearl's 
first brief, the issue came into trial mainly because Mr. Kearl refused to take prescription 
pain medications, but instead "self-medicated" by drinking alcohol. In his mind, alcohol 
was the lesser of the two evils. Plaintiff Kearl anticipated before trial that Defendant 
Okelberry would point to the lack of use of prescription pain medication as evidence of 
lack of pain, and then argue at trial that Plaintiff Kearl wasn't injured very badly if he 
didn't take pain medication. This is the main reason, along with knowledge of the 
prevailing community religious beliefs against use of alcohol, that Plaintiff Kearl 
requested the voir dire questions relating to prejudice against alcohol use. If a specific 
cite to the record is needed to show how the issue came into tri^l, for example, it came in 
as part of medical records. See Defendant Okelberry's trial Exhibit 21 which is a copy of 
Dr. Bacon's file at p. 0004 which is part of the appeal record in the envelope containing 
trial Exhibits. 
In a community with strongly held religious values regarding alcohol use and 
consumption, it is reasonable that in a case where alcohol consumption may come up, a 
court should be willing to ask specific questions about such potential biases, which may 
be an unconscious bias, so that counsel may know how best to Use its peremptory 
challenges. 
The Trial Court's general voir dire was inadequate to the task of ferreting out 
specific biases. As a result, a biased jury was impaneled. Had }he Trial Court asked 
Plaintiff Kearl's questions, such biases could have been discovered, but those questions 
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were rejected. On that basis of inadequacy and the authority cited above, this court 
should remand for a new trial. 
III. The Affidavits Offered by Jury Foreperson, Kay Armstrong, and by Mr. 
Kearl's Counsel Showing Juror Misconduct During Deliberation were 
Admissible, and Upon Receiving Them the Trial Court Should Have Made 
Further Inquiry into the Matter. 
An affidavit must be based on personal knowledge. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Considered under precedent set by this Court, Kay Armstrong's affidavit is. See, e.g., 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Forced Aire, LC, 202 P.3d 299, 303 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). 
It seems awkward that Defendant Okelberry would expect from a lay-juror that same 
precision of language often found lacking in legal counsel. The Court was not compelled 
to reach the same conclusions that Juror Kay Armstrong did based on what she saw and 
heard, and Plaintiff Kearl does not argue that. However, Kay Armstrong's affidavit, if 
nothing else, provides evidence of juror bias. This is not harmless error. The Court 
should have made investigation when presented with this affidavit showing prejudice as 
the Court did in West v. Holley, 103 P.3d. 708 (Utah 2003). 
Plaintiff Kearl argues that under State v. Woolley, the Trial Judge should have 
done more than rely on Juror Gary Harwood's assertion of his impartiality once the 
inference of bias had been raised. State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 445 (1991). Under 
Woolley, this Court held that, "[w]hen an inference of bias is raised, the inference is 
generally not rebutted simply by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or 
she can be fair and impartial." Id. at 445. Furthermore, mere statements made by jurors 
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that they intend to be impartial lose their meaning in light of other testimony and facts 
which suggest a bias. Id. At the very least, the Trial Court could have called in Juror 
Gary Harwood and asked follow-up questions in order to address the strong possibility of 
bias rather than just ignoring the evidence. West at 709. 
Last, Defendant Okelberry fails to address a very important fact. Perhaps because 
there is no rebuttal possible. Without Juror Gary Harwood, the jury could not have 
returned a verdict, because the vote of six jurors was required to reach a verdict, and there 
were only six who voted for the verdict, including Juror Gary Harward. Defendant 
Okelberry's Facts Relating to Juror Misconduct, No. 5, R. 8531 ("The jury was polled 
which confirmed that the verdict was agreed upon by six of the eight jurors."); Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial paragraph 2 ("Six [jurors] said no liability, and two said 
there was liability"). 
IV. Discovery Violations in Order to Surprise Opposing Counsel at Trial 
Constitute Egregious Attorney Misconduct Under the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and the Trial Court Should Have Offered 
Meaningful Sanctions. 
Defendant Okelberry in it facts section states that as Defendant Okelberry5 s 
counsel began to ask questions about the surprise exhibit, Plaintiff Kearl objected to 
Exhibit 38 on the grounds that he had never seen it and it could have been provided 
before it was used in trial. Brief of Appellee at 11, paragraph (c). This is half-true 
because Plaintiff Kearl objected twice. In addition to the objection referred to by 
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Defendant Okelberry, Plaintiff Kearl objected before the Exhibit was offered and 
admitted that he had never seen it before. R. at 948, p.5. 
Defendant Okelberry attempts to minimize this issue by arguing that this is an 
issue of timeliness and both parties were untimely at times in the case. But this is not an 
issue of untimliness. Defendant never did disclose the evidence until it was disclosed to 
the jury. This is an issue of intentional improper conduct and multiple violations of Court 
orders and case law, rules of procedure, rules of evidence, rule of conduct, and at least 
one statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that trial by ambush is improper. 
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 2000) ("[i]n the light of the modern practice 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial is not to be by ambush. Instead, the evidence 
upon which one relies for judgment can be, and should be, known to the opponent"). 
This Court has held that "[o]ne of the primary goals of the discovery process is 'to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the 
facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible." Glacier 
Land Co., L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Associates, LLC, 154 P.3d 852, 866 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006) (citing Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). The Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not allow what happened here, and the Rules of Professional Conduct are 
absolute in the practice's condemnation. See, e.g., Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.4 (litigant 
cannot obstruct another party's access to evidence, or disobey rules of tribunal), 8.4 
(intentional violation is professional misconduct). Defendant Okelberry attempts to 
minimize this issue, but it is no small matter. Such intentional misconduct is egregious, 
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and simply removing an exhibit from the jury after they have already been exposed to it 
without any explanation as to why it was removed, coupled with a minor chastisement in 
private, seems inadequate sanctions at best. Under such circumstances, if there is any 
doubt about the consequences of the effect of the evidence, the Court should error on the 
side of protecting the Plaintiff Kearl from any possible prejudice caused by the violations, 
but in this case the Court took every step possible to protect Defendant Okelberry from 
suffering any significant consequences from the violations. 
Defense counsel intentionally violated multiple rules and statutes and acted in 
utter disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct, especially Rule 4.4, Respect for 
Rights of Third Persons, which reads: 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not... use methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of...[third] person^]. 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 4.4(a). In its Exhibit 38, defense counsel relied on multiple 
confidential medical records and reports which each read at the top: "This report 
contains confidential information that is protected by law (Utah Code Ann. 58-60-1-1-(1) 
now 58-60-113) and must not be shared with any person without the written consent of 
the patient or a person legally appointed as power of attorney for the patient." Each 
report contained highly sensitive, personal information, including medical history and 
psychological evaluations. Not only did this violate several Rules of Professional 
conduct and the Court's order to disclose evidence, it also violated Section 58-60-113 and 
Utah Rules of Evidence 506, which provide that "patient has a privilege, during the 
patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing" 
17 
information that "is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating the patient." UtahR.Evid. 506(b).4 
The multiple violations were intentional. As mentioned in Plaintiff Kearl's Brief, 
at Trial parties were instructed to exchange all exhibits by October 6, 2007. (Plaintiff 
KearPs Br. 29, quoting R. 158.) Defendant Okelberry does well to acknowledge that the 
Trial Judge felt deceived by defense counsel's failure to make proper disclosure of its 
exhibit during discovery. (Appellee's Br. 13, quoting R. 948.) With this in mind, 
Plaintiff Kearl would remind this Court of Rule 3.4, Fairness to Opposing Party and 
Counsel, which reads: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal... 
Utah R. of Prof 1 Conduct 3.4(c). Discovery obligations are covered under such "rules of 
a tribunal." Also, Rule 8.4 Misconduct, which reads: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(c) engage in conduct involving ... deceit. 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 8.4(c). 
The proof of intent comes in an unusual statement made by Defendant Okelberry's 
counsel which she made because her conscience was bothering her. After hiding part of 
the exhibit from the Court and counsel, after the exhibit was objected to and received by 
the Court as evidence, and as she was walking up to the jury to present the exhibit to the 
4The Court stated that it did not know how Defendant Okelberry's counsel got the records 
which were confidential. R. at 948. p22. The Court could have asked her where she got 
them but he did not do so. An inquiry would have shown that she obtained them without 
permission. At least one of the persons whose records she took objected to the Court. R. 
at 948 12-13. 
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jury, she actually warned the Court that she was going to disclose a previously hidden 
part of the exhibit. This shows she knew what she was doing. She said, "In all fairness, 
your Honor, there is more information underneath that I am going to get into." Defendant 
Okelberry argues that this statement was proper disclosure. But it was not proper 
disclosure, and it was not "fair." Instead, it was an admission of intent to hide and then 
surprise. 
Defendant Okelberry argues that Dr. France "did not fumble or appear unable to 
answer" but he reviewed the material and answered "as far as he could tell, it was 
correct." First, the record cannot show surprise on someone's face, or hesitation in that 
person's voice, or facial expressions showing confusion. Second, Dr. France could not 
"review the material." He was asked to state whether a summary of scores of pages of 
medical records prepared beforehand by Defendant Okelberry was an accurate summary. 
He could only guess and say something like "as far as I can tellf" She was asking him if 
her summary of an estimated 120 pages of medical records was accurate. R. at 949, p.5. 
Defendant Okelberry's counsel disclosed a mountain of hidden information when 
she unveiled her surprise summary which overwhelmed Plaintiff Kearl's counsel and 
expert, and then she asked questions of Defendant Kearl's expert which he was not 
prepared to answer, and for which he could not prepare without prior review of all of the 
medical records upon which the summarization and questions were based. This 
undermined the credibility of Dr. France and of Plaintiff Kearl's case. These are anything 
but minor concerns, and the ambush which Defendant Okelberry accomplished by the 
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multiple violations described above is the result which the rules and statutes were 
established to prevent. 
Last, Defendant Kearl argues that the Court said the information on the exhibit 
was a summary of evidence that was "properly admitted." Brief of Appellee at 35, 
paragraph. This is not an accurate representation of what the Court said. The Court said 
this type of information is often used, but the Court did not have the ability to rule on this 
specific evidence because it was never disclosed. Neither Defendant nor the Court knew 
what the information behind the summary was without relying on the representation of 
Defendant Kearl's counsel to tell them what it was. R. at 948, p. 17-18. 
V. This Court Should Remand for a New Trial Based on the Trial Court's 
Incorrect Rulings on the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant Okelberry would have this Court believe that the next major issue is 
whether or not a judge is within his discretion to allow an expert witness to give 
contradictory testimony to another expert. Were this the issue, Plaintiff Kearl would be 
bound to agree, for the very same reasons cited by Defendant Okelberry. But this is not 
the issue. 
The issue argued by Mr. Kearl is that the Trial Judge made erroneous rulings 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence. Mr. Kearl preserved this issue by his timely (1) 
objections to the refusal of the Trial Court to allow Mr. Kearl to alert the jury to the fact 
that the witness was paid for by an insurance company, not the defendant's attorney, 
when to do so would in no way prove defendant's liability in the matter at hand, and by 
his motion in limine to (2) prevent the witness from offering testimony that is the result 
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of testing a product without sufficient evidence that the product was in substantially the 
same condition, in all relevant aspects, when tested as it was at the time of injury. 
Rulings on such matters, as decisions governed by the Rules of Evidence, are reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Silva, 13 P.3d at 607, 609. This Court 
"examine[s] (1) whether the trial court selected the correct rulp of evidence, (2) whether 
the trial court correctly interpreted that rule, and (3) whether the trial court correctly 
applied the rule." Id. at 607-08 {citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996)). 
A. The Trial Court Incorrectly Barred Mr, Kearl From Offering Evidence to 
Show that Mr. Smith had been Hired by Mr. Okdberry's Insurance 
Company when that Evidence was not being Offered to Show Negligence. 
Defendant Okelberry argues that Plaintiff Kearl failed to include a transcript of the 
record of the testimony of Craig Smith, and therefore Plaintiff KearPs argument fails. 
This is incorrect. The decision to allow Craig Smith to testify was made at the November 
24,2007, pretrial hearing where the Court denied Plaintiff KearPs motion in Limine (R. 
287) and ruled "the experts may testify." Docket at p. 10. Plairitiff Kearl did request a 
copy of that transcript but due to clerical or equipment error that hearing was not 
transcribed. See docket at page 11. 
Defendant Okelberry then argues that there is no showing of an abuse of 
discretion. Again, the proper standard is not abuse of discretion but correctness in 
applying the Rules of Evidence. The Utah Rule of Evidence that governs admissibility of 
liability insurance at trial is Rule 411. This rule is actually quit;e permissive, creating 
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only a prohibition against use of liability insurance evidence at trial to prove the 
defendant acted wrongfully, and allowing evidence of insurance for any other purpose. 
Utah R. Evid. 411. Among the common uses of insurance status at trial listed under the 
rule include showing control or alerting the jury to the potential biases of a witness. 
These, however, are only examples of the common uses of insurance status evidence, not 
a list of the only permissible uses. 
Defendant Okelberry would have this Court accept the argument that since 
counsel claimed to have hired the expert witness, the jury was already alerted to his 
possible biases. Not only does this argument misunderstand Rule 411, inferring that 
alerting a jury to the potential biases of a witness is the only permissible cause to offer 
the evidence, it does not square with the facts of the case. 
However, even if it were the case that the only permissible uses of liability 
insurance evidence was to show bias, Defendant Okelberry's argument still fails. Mr. 
Smith did not testify on behalf of Defendant Mr. Okelberry. In fact, Mr. Smith's 
testimony flatly contradicted that of Mr. Okelberry. R. at 948, pp. 35-36. Mr. Smith's 
testimony was offered in behalf of Mr. Okelberry's insurance company, which was the 
party that had in fact hired Mr. Smith and paid for his testimony. At the least, the jury 
was entitled to be alerted to that possible bias and special interest. See Sulivan v. Rixey, 
403 S.E.2d 346, 347 (Va. 1991) (trial court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff to inquire 
into witness' employment by insurance company); Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service 
Co., 276 S.W.2d 621, 624 (1955) ("[a witness]'s connection with the insurance company 
was relevant on the question of interest of the witness... a different interest is involved" 
22 
when an investigator is employed by the insurance company); Herbold v. Ford Motor 
Co., 221 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Ky. 1949) ("it is competent for [plaintiff] to show whom the 
witness was representing since this would tend to show bias or special interest of the 
witness"). 
Not only was there an issue of control and bias, but there was also an issue of 
confusion. Defendant Okelberry admits that the jury was told that "the expert was hired 
by Mr. Okelberry's attorney." Brief of Appellee at 40-41, foothote 10. Defendant 
Okelberry then argues that his attorney did hire Dr. Smith because his attorney made the 
"decision" to hire him. This becomes a half-truth which brings confusion because the 
real question is who paid for the expert. The Jury didn't know that Colorado Casualty 
paid for the expert and approved the hire. The jury knew Okelberry didn't pay for him 
because Okelberry said Dr. Smith's testimony was wrong. Because the jury does not have 
a clear understanding, it is lead astray by its ignorance and asks.4 Did Okelberry's attorney 
pay for Dr. Smith? Why would Okelberry's attorney pay for Dr. Smith? Does Okelberry 
need financial help? Is he poor? Should we protect him from further financial obligation? 
Does she have so much compassion for him that she is willing to fund his case for him? 
Does she believe in his case that much? Is Defendant Okelberr^'s attorney trying to 
show us how much she believes in his case and that she is willing to help him in his 
need? Should we also believe in his case and help him? The jury can logically conclude 
that Okelberry's attorney has, in effect, testified about the validity of her client case and 
her client's need for compassion. She cannot do it with her voice, but she has done it 
with her money. Can there be more moving and powerful testimony? 
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In summary, the Court's refusal to allow evidence of insurance made insurance a 
"sacred cow." That is, in order to protect the insurance company in this case, the Court 
made misleading and incomplete statements to the jury by telling the Jury that Ruth 
Shapiro hired Dr. Smith. This led to confusion and misunderstanding which Rule 411 
was intended to prevent. 
B. The Trial Court was Incorrect to Allow Mr, Craig Smith to Offer 
Testimony that was the Result of a Product Test Without Sufficient 
Evidence that the Product was in Substantially the Same Condition, in all 
Relevant Aspects, when Tested as it was at the Time of Injury. 
Defendant Okelberry argues that the Court denied Plaintiff Kearl's Motion in 
Limine to disallow Craig Smith because Plaintiff Kearl delayed in filing suit and it was 
unfair to let Plaintiff Kearl use this delay to disallow Defendant Okelberry's expert. This 
argument infers that the equipment damage which existed when inspected by Dr. Smith 
was partly the responsibility of Plaintiff Kearl who delayed and thereby allowed the 
damage to occur. (Defendant Okelberry's Brief of Appellee at 39). First, Plaintiff Kearl 
filed the Complaint and Motion in Limine timely. There was no improper delay. Second, 
Defendant Okelberry was the person who used the jack and caused the damage. Third, 
Dr. Smith could have purchased and inspected a new jack and thereby avoided confusion 
created by testifying that the used jack with a bent pin can fall on its own. If he inspected 
a new jack and said it could fall on its own, Plaintiff Kearl would not have objected.5 
5
 Defendant Okelberry said he purchased the jack at Lone Peak Trailers in Lehi, Utah. 
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Defendant Okelberry also argues that both experts inspected a "beat up" and 
"used" jack and the Court decided to allow both experts rather than exclude both experts. 
(Defendant Okelberry's Brief of Appellee at 39). First, it should be noted that Defendant 
Okelberry admits in this argument that the jack was "beat up" and "used" and was not in 
new condition when it was inspected. Second, Defendant Okelberry did not file a Motion 
in Limine to exclude Plaintiff KearPs expert, David Ingebretsei^. 
Defendant Okelberry argues that to grant Plaintiff Kearl's Motion in Limine the 
Court would have had to make a factual determination and "accept" Okelberry's 
testimony that the jack was new at the time of the injury. Brief of Appellee at 39. This 
argument is correct. However, Dr. Smith and the Court must acJcept Defendant 
Okelberry's testimony that the jack was new. Dr. Smith, even though he contradicted 
Defendant Okelberry about how the accident happened, was on Defendant Okelberry's 
side. Also, Defendant Okelberry's testimony was uncontested and could not be contested 
because Okelberry was the person who bought the jack. 
Defendant Okelberry also argues that Dr. Smith addresse4 the design of the jack. 
Brief of Appellee at 38. This is not true. Dr. Smith testified in essence that a jack with a 
bent pin and bent sides can fall spontaneously without any person touching it. This may 
be true, but it is irrelevant and confusing, and can easily be misleading, because the jack 
was new and not bent. 
Defendant Okelberry also argues that Plaintiff Kearl cites no authority for the 
proposition that the jack tested by Defendant Okelberry must be substantially the same as 
the jack that failed. Brief of Appellee at 40. This issue was origipally laid out in Mr. 
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Kearl's Motion in Limine and Memorandum in Support, dated 7 September 2007. (R. 
230-87.) As explained therein, where a product is tested there must be sufficient 
evidence that it was in substantially the same condition - in relevant respects - when 
tested as it was at the time of injury. Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 
104 F.3d 472, 479 (1st Cir. 1997) (citingKukuruza v. GeneralElec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208, 
1211-1211 (lSICir. 1975). In understanding this issue, Kukuruza is especially useful. 
Under that case, for testimony to be offered that was the result of a product test, a 
showing of the product's condition at the time of the injury and the time of the inspection 
was required. 
On September 8, 2001, at the time of injury, the jack was brand new and newly 
installed by Mr. Okelberry on his trailer. Mr. Okelberry, under oath at deposition, 
affirmed that the jack's "installation was complete," that it "never bent or nothing," and 
that the "jack was brand-new and it was just taken out of the wrapper." It was in proper 
working condition. In contrast, the jack was bent when Dr. Craig Smith tested the jack six 
years later. At that time the jack had excessive wear and was damaged, bent, and the 
locking pins malfunctioned. R. 285 (Okelberry testifies the jack was new); R. 302-305 
(Safety features preventing the jack from falling were bent and incapable of serving their 
purpose when Dr. Smith inspected the jack and rendered his opinion that the jack fell on 
its own). 
Defendant Okelberry admits in his Statement of Facts opposing Plaintiff Kearl's 
Motion in Limine to exclude Dr. Smith, that after the jack was used for six years, Dr. 
Smith concluded that the "the pins [pins of the jack that held up the trailer] only partially 
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engaged allowing the trailer to fall when bumped or disturbed." R. at 334, paragraphs 14-
16. As such, the Trial Judge's ruling that Dr. Craig Smith's testimony was admissible as 
it related to the test he performed on the trailer was incorrect. 
VI. Has Mr. Kearl Shown an Abuse of Discretion by the Trial Court in 
Declining to Instruct the Jury Regarding Alcohol Use as a Pre-existing 
Condition? 
Again, Plaintiff Kearl maintains its position as laid out in its original Brief, 
reminding the Court, as conceded by Appellee, this issue is reviewed for correctness. 
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 86 P.3d 752, 754 (UT App 2004). 
Defendant Okelberry argues that this issue should be ignored because the "jury 
never reached damages" but found against Plaintiff Kearl on liability. However, this 
argument overlooks the fact that the jury never reached damages because of the prejudice 
it had against Plaintiff. 
Defendant Okelberry also argues that because Plaintiff Kearl does not cite what 
evidence supports the instruction, the claim must fail. This is not true. Plaintiff Kearl has 
cited to the record showing that the issue of alcohol was introduced at trial. See 
Defendant's trial Exhibit 13 at p. 1, and Defendant's Exhibit 21 at 0004. Also, this 
objection is raised for the first time on appeal. It was not raised in Defendant Okelberry's 
Response to Motion for New Trial. R. at 855. Probably because Defendant Okelberry's 
trial counsel knew that the Court knew that the alcohol issue was part of the trial and an 
objection would have been viewed by the Court as foolish. Plaintiff raised the specific 
issue of alcohol prejudice at the time of voir dire as cited in his Brief of Appellant, and it 
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remained an issue to the end of trial when Plaintiff Kearl objected to the jury instructions 
because they failed to address alcohol use. Defendant's Okelberry's present counsel was 
not at trial and therefore raises the objection for the first time. Also, at the time of the 
objection to Jury Instructions, Plaintiff Kearl explained the reason for his request for an 
instruction about alcohol (he drank alcohol in response to the pain from the injury and 
some of the jurors might find that improper). R. at 948, p. 27-28. 
VIII. The Trial Judge Erred in not Recusing Himself from Ruling on his Own 
Propriety. 
Defendant Okelberry admits that the standard of review is unclear on this issue. 
(Appellee's Br. 5.) Plaintiff Kearl concurs. Defendant Okelberry would have this Court 
make its ruling based on an abuse of discretion; Plaintiff Kearl believes a higher level of 
scrutiny is required. 
Plaintiff Kearl's argument is simple and straightforward: A Judge should not rule 
on his own propriety. After Plaintiff Kearl asked the Court to recuse itself on its own 
motion, and pointed to specific behavior (court meeting ex parte with other counsel) as a 
basis for the request, the Court should have referred the matter to another judge to decide 
the issue. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct is very clear on the matter. It reads: "A 
judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to" enumerated instances. 
C.J.C. Cannon 3E(1). 
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Note, the Code of Judicial Conduct says "shall"- not may, not should, but shall. 
Had the rules said may or should, Plaintiff Kearl would be compelled to agree with 
Defendant Okelberry. May is discretionary, and an argument can be made that should is 
perhaps discretionary as well. But shall is mandatory. Surely, a violation of such a rule 
must be reviewed under a higher standard than a simple abuse of discretion. 
Defendant Okelberry argues that the Motion to Disqualify was untimely and 
withdrawn and therefore this issue is resolved. Brief of Appellee at 46. This argument 
overlooks the fact that Plaintiff Kearl raised the issue of bias, afad the Court has a duty 
under the Rules to resolve the issue and not ignore it as the Trial Court did here. 
Defendant Okelberry also argues that waiting for the jury was "boring" and 
"chatting informally" ex parte was the Trial Court's way of beiiig polite. Wishing 
Defendant Okelberry "good luck" was a "social platitude," and since the 'brief 
interaction" did not show bias and did not "arise from occurrences in the proceedings 
before the judge" it cannot be a basis of disqualification. R. at 47-49. Plaintiff Kearl 
does not mention the part of the conversation where the Court's evaluated Plaintiff 
Kearl's counsel's performance at trial after she asked the Court for an evaluation of her 
performance at trial. First, this incident did arise from "occurrences in the proceedings 
before the judge." Second, Defendant Kearl viewed this ex parte meeting to be one sided 
since he was available and uninvited. Third, Defendant Kearl should have been invited 
and he would have expected the same evaluation and encouragetnent, although it would 
admittedly be difficult for the Court to do this with a threesome. 
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The Trial Judge should have recused himself from ruling on the issue of 
disqualification once it was raised, since much of that Motion dealt directly with how the 
Judge had administered his Court Room. How can judges' impartiality not be reasonably 
questioned in instances where they are ruling on their own propriety? Surely that 
qualifies as "a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case." See C.J.C. Cannon 
3E(l)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, and for all the reasons enumerated in Plaintiff 
Kearl's original Brief, Plaintiff Kearl respectfully requests this Court remand for a New 
Trial. 
DATED this y day of October 2009. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dentoh M. Hatch 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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PROSPECTIVE JURY QUESTIONNAIRE 
NAME: U'~ XJ«u* ^ > L u M > } ^ 
This questionnaire is being submitted to each of you so that the lawyers can select a fair and 
impartial jury. It is important that you answer each question truthfully. Because this 
questionnaire is part of the jury process, the questions must be answered by you under a penalty 
ofperjury. 
1. Please state your age, the city where you reside, length of time in this county and your 
level of education, rjj ^ ^ pA*o& 7 J - ^ 4 ^ 
2. List current occupation and your main job responsibilities. Also, list any other 
employment within the past five years. S J\,c&ikjl ) 
3. Martial Status. If married, your spouse's name and present employment. 
4. If you are employed, do you supervise or manage any person or persons as part of your 
employment? If so, please explain. **z& 
5. Have you ever served as a juror before? If so, please explain when, where, what type of 
case and if it was resolved by a juiy. CtU^^Sl&tf [fat/ S>^AXA+^C-K 
6. Have you or a member of your immediate family been a witness in a lawsuit? If yes, 
please explain where, when, for what, and whether you actually testified in court. /**-& 
7 Do you have any feelings as to people who file civil lawsuits as a means of resolving 
disputes? 
CFavor) li^/' Oppose No Opinion 
Comments: ( H^lai^ud ) 
8. Do you believe you have a valid reason that would make it difficult for you to serve as a 
juror? If necessary, the Judge can discuss this with you privately. 
9. In your role as a juror, you may be asked to make a decision as to an award of damages. 
Would you have any reservation in doing so? If so, please explain. 
10. If you were in the position of either party, would you feel comfortable with yourself as a 
juror? If not, please explain. ^O^L^' 
11. Have you or a member of your immediate family ever been involved in a lawsuit of any 
kind? If so, please state the nature of the case, how it was resolved, when and where it 
occurred and whether you were a plaintiff or defendant. 
12. Have you ever been injured in an accident? If so, please explain when, where, and the 
injuries involved, i^te^u? - *^JM^' 
14. What magazines and/or newspapers do you read regularly? 
15. What are your hobbies and how do you like to spend your leisure time? 
16. Please list any civic clubs or organizations in which you are a member. 
\ 7. Do you have any experience in handling medical claims for injuries? If so, please 
explain. ^ ^ 
18. Have you had any educational training or experience in the health care field or as an 
economist? If so, please explain. s^lp 
Do you have any physical or emotional concerns which would make it difficult for you to 
serve as a juror? If so, die judge will talk to you privately. 
The following individuals may testify during the trial. Are you acquainted with any of 
them? If so, please explain. s^-'Lfr 
Robert Kearl Dr. Jared Clegg Steven Nicoltaus 
Jessica Kearl Colton Kearl Joshua Kearl 
David Ingebretsen Karen Kearl Dr. Ronald France 
Lana Marshall Dr. William Bacon Sue Ann Okelberry 
Edwin Ray Okelberry Dr. Craig Smith 
